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Introduction
On the 15th of December 2016 the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber
handed down its judgment in the case of Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, which partially
reversed the Chamber ruling issued on the 1st of September 2015. The case is about
immigration detention at the Italian borders (including the island of Lampedusa) and
the expulsion of aliens from Italy to Tunisia. Whilst the events took place in 2011, during
that peculiar time which was in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, the issues
raised before the Court by the applicants and the principle outlined by the judgments
appears relevant to the current refugee crisis and its management by the European
Union Institutions and Member States.
1. The Facts
The applicants are three Tunisian nationals who, just like thousands of migrants every
year, attempted to enter Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea from northern
Africa to the Italian coast on board rudimentary vessels. The events took place in
September 2011, when the flux of migrations was particularly high due to the
revolutionary riots (so-called Arab Spring), which had just taken place in some North
African countries. While heading to Lampedusa, the applicants were intercepted by the
Italian coastguard and brought to the “Early Reception and Aid Centre” (“Centro di
Soccorso e Prima Accoglienza” or “CSPA”) located on the island. They were kept at
the centre for several days: the first applicant from the 17th to the 20th of September;
and the second and the third applicants from the 18th to the 20th of September. When
a fire partially damaged the centre, the migrants were first taken to a sports facility and
then they escaped and proceeded to move around the island. On the 22nd of
September, after having been stopped by the police, the applicants were transferred
by airplane to Palermo (Sicily), where they were confined on board ships moored in the
harbour for a few days, together with hundreds of other migrants. On the 27th of
September, dozens of these migrants, including the second and third applicants, were
taken by bus from the ships to the Palermo airport, where they briefly met the Tunisian
Consul and immediately afterwards were returned to Tunisia. On the 29th of
September, the first applicant followed the same procedure and was returned to
Tunisia as well.
2. The Application to the ECHR and the Chamber Judgment
The applicants have alleged that Italian Government violated several of their rights as
provided by the ECHR. Firstly, their right to liberty (Article 5 ECHR) was violated
because the Lampedusa reception centre and the ships had been used as detention
centres without any legal basis (Article 5 § 1), without providing any information to the
detainees (Article 5 § 2), nor granting them access to judicial review (Article 5 § 4).
Secondly, their right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment (Article
3) was violated on account of the overcrowding and the poor health and hygiene
conditions in which they were held both in the reception centre and on board the ships.
Thirdly, their right not to be subjected to collective expulsion (Article 4 of Protocol No.
4 to the Convention) was violated because their forced returns had been decided
according to a bilateral agreement signed between Italy and Tunisia in April 2011, i.e.
on the sole basis of their nationality, without any consideration of their individual
situations. Finally, their right to an effective remedy (Article 13), taken together with
Article 3 and Article of 4 Protocol No. 4 was violated because they could neither
effectively challenge before a national court the conditions of their detention nor the
return procedure.
The Chamber judgment was handed down on the 1st of September 2015. The Court
unanimously found violations of Article 5 with regard to § 1, § 2 and § 4. As to Article 3,
the Court majority (five votes to two) found a violation in relation to the conditions in
which the applicants were held at the Lampedusa reception centre, but not in relation
to those conditions in which the applicants were held on board the ships moored in
Palermo. The same majority also pointed out a series of factors indicating that the
expulsion was collective in nature and, thus, in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4
(see § 156: «the refusal-of-entry orders did not contain any reference to the personal
situations of the applicants; the Government failed to produce any document capable
of proving that individual interviews concerning the specific situation of each applicant
had taken place prior to the issuance of the orders; a large number of individuals of the
same origin, around the time of the facts at issue, were subjected to the same
outcome as the applicants; and the bilateral agreements with Tunisia, which have not
been made public, provided for the return of unlawful migrants through simplified
procedures, on the basis of the mere identification of the person concerned by the
Tunisian consular authorities»). Finally, again the majority held that there had also
been a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3, due to the lack of any
effective remedy to challenge the conditions of confinement; and another breach of
Article 13 taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, because the refusal-of-entry
orders issued against the applicants expressly stated that the lodging of an appeal
would not have suspended their enforcement.
3. The Grand Chamber Judgment
In February 2016, the Italian Government request of referral to the Grand Chamber was
accepted. The public hearing took place on the 22nd of June 2016 and the final
judgment was delivered on the 15th of December 2016. The Grand Chamber confirmed
the violations of Article 5 § 1, § 2 and § 4 and confirmed a violation of Article 13 taken
together with Article 3.
3.1. Statements Concerning Immigration Detention
Just as the Chamber had previously determined, the Grand Chamber found
unanimously that there had been violations of Article 5 § 1, § 2 and § 4.
The Government had objected arguing that the applicants were not deprived of their
liberty (and thus the Court lacked jurisdiction ratione materiae under Article 5), since
neither the Lampedusa reception centre nor the ships moored in Palermo were
designed for detention but rather to provide first aid and assistance (in terms of health
and hygiene) to the migrants for the time necessary to identify them and to proceed
with their return (§§ 58-60). The Court rejected the argument by recalling that, «in
order to determine whether a person has been deprived of liberty, the starting-point
must be his or her concrete situation, and account must be taken of a whole range of
criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the
measure in question» (§ 64). With regard to the present case, the Court began by
noting that it was not in dispute between the parties, and it was also confirmed by
reports issued by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Italian
Senate’s Special Commission for Human Rights, that the reception centre was under
surveillance and that the migrants were prohibited from leaving the centre (§ 65), and
that the same happened with the ships, which the Government considered “a natural
extension of the reception centre” (§ 66-69). Additionally, the Court noted that the
deprivation of liberty was not insignificant in duration: indeed, summing up the period
spent in the Lampedusa reception centre and the period on board the ships, the
confinement lasted for about twelve days in the case of the first applicant and about
nine days in that of the second and third applicants (§ 70). Finally, the Court
emphasized that neither the classification of the confinement under domestic law, nor
the authorities’ alleged aim to assist the applicants and ensure their safety, could alter
the nature of the constraining measures imposed. Indeed, «even measures intended
for protection or taken in the interest of the person concerned may be regarded as a
deprivation of liberty» (§ 71).
Having stated that Article 5 applied to the case, the Court concluded that its provisions
had been violated by the Italian Government. With regard to Article 5 § 1, even if the
detention of the applicants under the provision of letter (f) was to control the liberty of
aliens in an immigration context (§ 96), the Court noted that it was devoid of any legal
basis. According to Italian immigration law, immigration detention is only possible
within dedicated centres (the CIE, “Centres for Identification and Expulsion of Aliens”)
and under certain strict circumstances (for instance, where a refusal-of-entry measure
or an expulsion cannot be implemented immediately, because it is necessary to provide
assistance to the alien, to conduct additional identity checks, or to wait for travel
documents or the availability of a carrier): in the present case, the Government itself
admitted that the applicants had not been held within a CIE because those conditions
were not met, thus conceding that their detention was not authorized under Italian law
(§ 98). Furthermore, the Court stated that the bilateral agreement for readmission of
aliens signed between Italy and Tunisia could not provide a proper legal basis for
detention, above all because its full text had not been made public and, thus, it was not
accessible to the applicants (§ 102-103).
With regard to Article 5 § 2, having already found that the applicants’ detention had no
clear and accessible legal basis in Italian law, the Court failed to see «how the
authorities could have informed the applicants of the legal reasons for their deprivation
of liberty or thus have provided them with sufficient information to enable them to
challenge the grounds for the measure before a court» (§ 117); to be clear, the Court
pointed out that «information about the legal status of a migrant or about the possible
removal measures that could be implemented cannot satisfy the need for information
as to the legal basis for the migrant’s deprivation of liberty» (§ 118).
With regard to Article 5 § 4, the Court recalled that, where detainees are not informed
of the reasons for their deprivation of liberty, their right to appeal against their
detention is deprived of all effective substance (§ 132). Therefore, the Court
considered that its finding under Article 5 § 2 constituted sufficient grounds to
conclude that the Italian legal system did not provide the applicants with an effective
remedy to challenge the lawfulness of their deprivation of liberty (§ 133). It must also
be emphasized that, in the part of the judgment addressing the issue of Article 5 § 1,
the Court already pointed out the unavailability of effective remedies by arguing that,
since the Lampedusa reception centre and the boats were formally regarded as 
reception facilities, the applicants could not have enjoyed the safeguards of habeas
corpus applicable to placement inside the Italian detention centres for migrants (the
CIE), i.e. the validation by an administrative decision subject to review by a competent
court (§ 105).
3.2. Statements Concerning Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
With regard to Article 3, the Grand Chamber confirmed the Chamber judgment as to
the conditions on board the ships and reversed it with regard to the Lampedusa
reception centre, thus declaring that in neither situation did the applicants suffer
inhuman or degrading treatment.
As a general statement, the Grand Chamber pointed out that, without prejudice to the
absolute character of Article 3 and the related principle that an increasing influx of
migrants cannot absolve a State of its obligations under that provision, yet «it would
certainly be artificial to examine the facts of the case without considering the general
context in which those facts arose» (§ 185). The Court took into consideration that the
situation in 2011 was exceptional (§ 180) and therefore decided to make its assessment
bearing in mind that «the undeniable difficulties and inconveniences endured by the
applicants stemmed to a significant extent from the situation of extreme difficulty
confronting the Italian authorities at the relevant time» (§ 185).
As to the confinement in Lampedusa, the Grand Chamber found that, having
considered the situation taken as a whole, as well as the specific circumstances of the
applicants’ case, the treatment they complained of did not exceed the level of severity
required for it to fall within Article 3 of the Convention (§§ 190-198). Among other
factors, the Court specifically stressed that, «even though the number of square
metres per person in the centre’s rooms has not been established […] the freedom of
movement enjoyed by the applicants in the CSPA must have alleviated in part, or even
to a significant extent, the constraints caused by the fact that the centre’s maximum
capacity was exceeded» (§ 193). Moreover, the Grand Chamber emphasized that the
applicants had been confined within the reception centre only for three and four days
respectively, and that their cases could be distinguished from those where the
violation was recognized in spite of the short duration of the confinement (§ 195-196).
As to the confinement on board the ships moored in Palermo the Grand Chamber
pointed out that the applicants had not presented any objective proof of their
allegations (overcrowding and extreme health and hygiene conditions) and it refused
their request to shift the burden of proof upon the Government: «the burden of proof
in this area may be reversed where allegations of ill-treatment at the hands of the
police or other similar agents of the State are arguable and based on corroborating
factors, such as the existence of injuries of unknown and unexplained origin» (§ 206).
Furthermore, the Grand Chamber attached «decisive weight» to the fact that the
Government had produced before it a judicial decision rendered by an Italian court
contradicting the applicants’ account. Although the applicants criticized this decision
with regard to its evidentiary basis (they highlighted that the decision was mainly
based on the statements of a member of the Italian Parliament to the press and not
reiterated at the hearing, and that the police had been present when the member of
the Parliament visited the ships), the Court ruled that mere speculation cannot call into
question the assessment of the facts by an independent domestic court (§§ 207-208).
3.3. Statements Concerning Collective Expulsions
By a vote of sixteen to one, the majority of the Grand Chamber reversed the ruling of
the Chamber and declared that no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the
Convention had occurred.
The Grand Chamber first recalled that, according to its case-law, collective expulsion is
to be understood as «any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country,
except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective
examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group» (§237). The
purpose of this provision is in fact «to prevent States from being able to remove a
certain number of aliens without examining their personal circumstances and therefore
without enabling them to put forward their arguments against the measure taken by
the relevant authority» (§ 238).
With regard to the present case, the Court noted that, on the one hand, it was
undisputed that the applicants underwent identification on two occasions (i.e.
immediately after their arrival, by the Italian authorities at the reception centre; and
before they boarded the planes for Tunis, by the Tunisian consul); on the other hand,
the parties disagreed with regard to the conditions of the first identification. The
applicants alleged that the Italian authorities had merely recorded their identities and
fingerprints, without taking their personal situations into account, while the
Government instead argued that the identification had consisted of a genuine
individual interview, carried out in the presence of an interpreter or cultural mediator,
following which the authorities filled out an “information sheet” containing personal
data and any circumstances specific to each migrant. Although the Government was
unable to produce the applicants’ “information sheets”, the Court accepted its version,
considering it a «plausible explanation» that those documents had been destroyed in
the fire at the reception centre (§ 246).
Additionally, the Grand Chamber stated that «Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 does not
guarantee the right to an individual interview in all circumstances; the requirements of
this provision may be satisfied where each alien has a genuine and effective possibility
of submitting arguments against his or her expulsion, and where those arguments are
examined in an appropriate manner by the authorities of the respondent State» (§
248). Noting that the applicants remained between nine and twelve days in Italy, the
Court concluded that «during that not insignificant period of time the applicants had
the possibility of drawing the attention of the national authorities to any circumstance
that might affect their status and entitle them to remain in Italy» (§ 249). Moreover, the
Court emphasized that, before boarding the planes for Tunis, the applicants were
received by the Tunisian Consul, and that this later check «gave them a last chance to
raise arguments against their expulsion» (§ 250).
The Grand Chamber then addressed other factors which the Chamber had considered
relevant to prove the collective nature of the expulsion, i.e. the fact that the refusal-of-
entry orders had been drafted in comparable terms, only differing as to the personal
data of each migrant, and that a large number of aliens of the same origin had been
expelled at the relevant time. In this regard, the Grand Chamber referred to case law
according to which such scenarios do not automatically lead to a violation if each
person concerned had been given the opportunity to make arguments against his
expulsion to the competent authorities on an individual basis (§§ 239 and 251).
The Court then further noted and called into question the usefulness of an individual
interview in the present case, by observing that «the applicants’ representatives, both
in their written observations and at the public hearing, were unable to indicate the
slightest factual or legal ground which, under international or national law, could have
justified their clients’ presence on Italian territory and preclude their removal» (§ 253).
Finally, the Court considered it «unnecessary […] to address the question whether, as
the Government argued, the April 2011 agreement between Italy and Tunisia, which has
not been made public, can be regarded as a “readmission” agreement within the
meaning of the Return Directive, and whether this could have implications under
Article 4 of Protocol No. 4» (§ 255).
3.4. Statements Concerning the Availability of Effective Remedies at National Level
The Grand Chamber confirmed the Chamber judgment on the violation of Article 13
taken together with Article 3, but reversed it with regard to a violation of Article 13
taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.
As to inhuman and degrading treatments, the Grand Chamber observed that the
Government did not indicate any remedy by which the applicants could have
complained about the conditions in which they were held both in Lampedusa and on
board the ships. For instance, an appeal to the competent court against the refusal-of-
entry orders would have served only to challenge the lawfulness of their removal (§
270).
As to collective expulsion, given that a remedy was available under national law, the
Court examined whether the fact that such remedy did not provide an automatic
suspensive effect of the removal order constituted itself a violation of Article 13. While
the Chamber answered this question in the affirmative, the Grand Chamber held the
opposite opinion: relying on the case-law De Souza Ribeiro v. France, Čonka v. Belgium
and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, the Grand Chamber stated that an obligation for
States to provide for such a remedy (i.e. an appeal with automatic suspensive effect)
only arises «where the person concerned alleges that the enforcement of the
expulsion would expose him or her to a real risk of ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 of
the Convention or of a violation of his or her right to life under Article 2, on account of
the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk of torture or ill-treatment
materialised» (§ 276). Given that in the present case the applicants did not claim any
of those risks, the Court concluded that the absence of an automatic suspensive
effect did not entail a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 4 of Protocol
No. 4.
4. Comment
Due to its scope and abundance of content, the Khlaifia and Others judgment deserves
more thorough deliberation than that which follows. However, it is worthwhile to
highlight herein some of the strengths and weaknesses, which arise in its
interpretation. An Annex summarises the implications for interpretation of EU law in
this field.
With reference to rulings relating to Article 5, the judgment represents a major step
forward in the process of improving the protection for those people, even today, who
are crossing the European borders despite not having any valid entry documentation.
Suffice it, in this regard, to refer to October 2016, when Amnesty International released
a report wherein it denounced, among other things, the practices of arbitrary detention
carried out within the new “Hotspots” located at the European borders (see Amnesty
International, Hotspot Italy. How EU’s flagship approach leads to violations of refugee
and migrant rights, p. 26-29). Hereinafter, if the Member States continue to find the
deprivation of liberty as a necessary tool to contrast illegal migration, they must adopt
laws, which clearly and precisely govern the substantive requirements and procedural
guarantees with particular reference the right to habeas corpus. The European Court,
indeed, has established that no de facto deprivation of liberty exempt from judicial
review is compatible with the aim of Article 5, explicitly stating that this applies "even
in the context of a migration crisis" (§ 106).
With reference to ECHR Article 3, it is necessary to consider the judgment excerpt
wherein the Court highlights the necessity to take into consideration the emergency
situation that began in 2011 due to the increased migration as a consequence of the
Arab Spring. While, from one side, such a statement is troubling because it seems like
an attack on the mandatory character of Article 3, as well as  signalling a step
backwards with respect to the principles established in the M.S.S. v. Belgium and
Greece (§ 223) and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (§§ 122 and 176) cases; on the other
side, its scope must be defined in light of the characteristics of the case, namely, to a
situation in which - at least according to the findings of the Court - the respondent
State had not deliberately violated the prohibition against inhuman and degrading
treatment, but rather found itself faced with the objective inability to provide better
immigration reception conditions. The ratio decidendi, therefore, complies with the
logic of the principle ad impossibilia nemo tenetur. In a key criticism, however, it is
possible to see how the unlawful deprivation of liberty inflicted by the Italian
Government on migrants had contributed to aggravating the consequences of the
humanitarian emergency in terms of overcrowding and the poor health and hygiene
conditions of the places where the migrants have been confined: the Grand Chamber
could perhaps have taken greater consideration of this circumstance in assessing the
existence of a violation of Article 3.
Turning, finally, to the aspects related to the prohibition against collective expulsions
and the availability of domestic remedies to challenge them, it is notable how the
judgment is thwarted by a fundamental ambiguity with regard to the scope of Article 4
of Protocol No. 4 (and its relationship with Article 13).
It is unclear whether the Court denied the existence of the collective expulsion
because it determined that the applicants had benefited from individual interviews
(according to the version provided by the Government and deemed reliable by the
Court), or because the Court determined that the Government had no obligation to
conduct individual interviews because no risk arose to the life or physical well being of
the applicants according to Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. The simplest and most
plausible solution is that the Court intended to settle both issues cumulatively. That
being said, the assertion that the obligation to conduct individual interviews exists only
in the presence of risks to life or physical well being itself is open to criticism. This
interpretation, in fact, makes the provision of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 virtually
useless (interpretatio abrogans), assuming that the same identical result is reached by
directly applying the principle of non-refoulement arising from Articles 2 and 3
(according to the established case law starting from the famous case of Soering v.
United Kingdom).
For this reason, the restrictive interpretation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 proposed by
the Court does not seem reasonable and sound. The same is true with reference to the
guarantees arising from Article 13 in relation to Article 4 of Protocol No. 4: if the
automatic suspensive effect was mandatory only in the presence of risk of harm, then
the protection provided by Article 13 in relation with Article 2 and 3 would be enough.
The most persuasive interpretation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 seems, instead, to be
that which was proposed by the applicants - and also supported by the third parties
that intervened before the Grand Chamber (see in particular §§ 234-236), as well as by
the partially dissenting opinion of Judge Serghides – according to which, Article 4 of
Protocol No. 4 provides procedural guarantees that are independent from the concrete
situation of the individual applicant because it is designed to ascertain such situation.
Therefore, the only effective domestic remedy pursuant to Article 13 to prevent the
violation of such procedural guarantee is necessarily one that envisages an automatic
suspensive effect of the expulsion. A third party (see § 265) and the aforementioned
dissenting opinion expressed their opinions to this effect (see in particular §§ 73-74 of
the opinion, where the judge refers to the De Souza Ribeiro, Čonka and Hirsi Jamaa
and Others case law in order to highlight how, in hindsight, they offered arguments
supporting the opposite conclusions than those of the majority).
Therefore, valid arguments exist to support that the violations of Article 4 of Protocol
No. 4 and Article 13 in relation to it, are integrated in each case in which the applicants
are not given the opportunity to "put forward arguments" in support of their condition,
nor are they granted a remedy having suspensive effect, regardless of any prediction
concerning the contents of the statements they might have made to the authorities, as
well as, any evaluation regarding the "safe country" nature of the destination country
(without prejudice to the fact that, if risks to life and physical well being of the foreigner
actually arise, his expulsion could lead to different and further violations of Articles 2
and 3).
This interpretation, in addition to being consistent with the text and the general
scheme of the Convention, is the only one able to protect migrants without valid
documents from potential abuses and arbitrary decisions by the border authorities: in
this context, therefore, it seems that the Strasbourg Court has missed an important
opportunity to impose a substantial level of protection of fundamental rights with
regard to the current immigration crisis that Europe is facing.
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Annex: the EU law implications
Professor Steve Peers
Neither the main judgment in this case nor the concurring and dissenting judgments
discuss EU law aspects in any detail. Nevertheless, in light of the ECJ’s tendency to
take account of Strasbourg judgments, the ruling will have consequences for the
interpretation of EU law, particularly in the context of the perceived ‘migration crisis’
which the ECtHR refers to.
First of all, the ruling that being kept in asylum reception centres and ships may
amount to detention is significant for interpreting the EU’s reception conditions
Directive (as regards detention of asylum-seekers) and the Returns Directive (as
regards the detention of irregular migrants, given that the ECJ has already ruled that
the ECtHR’s interpretation of ‘detention’ is relevant for applying the EU law on the
European Arrest Warrant.
Secondly, the interpretation of ‘lawfulness’ of detention under the ECHR is also
relevant, given that the EU legislation requires such detention to be lawful as well.  
Thirdly, the insistence that judicial control of detention is essential 'even in the context
of a migration crisis' makes clear that there is no ‘crisis’ excuse to avoid judicial review
of migration or asylum detention (for the most recent ECJ case law on this issue, see
discussion here). The ruling on the breach of Article 5(4) ECHR regarding judicial
review follows from the breach of Article 5(2), and is relevant to the interpretation of
Article 9(3) of the reception conditions Directive and Article 15(2) of the Returns
Directive.
Fourthly, as for the breach of Article 5(2) ECHR because the migrants were not told
why they were detained (it being irrelevant that they know they were entering illegally)
confirms the wording of Article 9(4) of the reception conditions Directive, but adds to
the wording of Article 15(2) of the Returns Directive, which contains no express
requirement to inform.
Fifth, the ruling that there was no breach of Article 3 as regards conditions in either
reception centres or ships, giving states some latitude in the context of the migration
crisis, is relevant to the interpretation of the rules in the reception conditions Directive
and the Returns Directive on the conditions of detention.
Sixth, the Returns Directive and the asylum procedures Directive do not ban collective
expulsion explicitly, but it is implicit from the requirement of individual decision-making
and the obligation to comply with the EU Charter of Rights, which bans collective
expulsion expressly. The ECtHR judgment is therefore relevant in that it confirms that
the ban on collective expulsion also applies if States define it as a refusal of entry, but
also as regards the ruling that the ECHR is not breached in the absence of individual
interviews as long as they can make a case against expulsion. This falls well below the
standard in the asylum procedures Directive as regards the asylum process, and also
probably below the ‘right to be heard’ guaranteed by the ECJ case law regarding
irregular migrants and the Returns Directive.
Seventh, the breach of Article 13 ECHR as regards the lack of an effective remedy
regarding detention conditions could be relevant to EU law. Although a remedy on this
issue is not expressly mentioned in Article 10 of the reception conditions Directive or
Article 16 of the Returns Directive, it follows from Article 47 of the Charter (the
‘effective remedies’ clause) that such a remedy must be available.
Finally, the compliance with Article 13 ECHR as regards the lack of a right to of a right
of suspensive effect of an appeal as there was no allegation of a risk of breaching
Articles 2 or 3 ECHR justifies the lack of suspensive effect of a challenge to an
expulsion under the Returns Directive, except in special cases as defined by the ECJ.
Conversely, it confirms that there must be either suspensive effect of an appeal or the
possibility to request such suspensive effect in asylum cases, as set out in the
procedures Directive.
